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PERMITTED AT THE SENTENCING
PHASE OF A CAPITAL TRIAL
South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989).
I. INTRODUCTION
In South Carolina v. Gathers,' the United States Supreme Court
held that the eighth amendment 2 prohibits prosecutorial commen-
tary concerning the victim's personal qualities at the sentencing
phase of a capital case.3 This Note explores the Gathers opinions
and concludes that the Court correctly held that the prosecutor's
comments concerning the victim's personal qualities could not have
been relevant to the "circumstances of the crime" and should have
been barred from the sentencing proceeding.4 This Note further
considers the weaknesses of the dissenters' arguments and con-
cludes that the dissenters' arguments are largely unfounded and
represent superficial arguments for the admissibility of commentary
or evidence regarding the victim's personal qualities at the sentenc-
ing phase of a capital trial.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On a Saturday evening in September of 1986, Demetrius Gath-
ers and three companions approached a park bench where Richard
Haynes, a stranger to them, sat.5 After Haynes refused to converse
with Gathers, Gathers and two of his companions brutally beat him.6
As Haynes lay unconscious on the ground, Gathers and the other
1 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989).
2 For text of the eighth amendment, see infra note 42.
3 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2210-11.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 2208.
6 Id.
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assailants rummaged through Haynes' belongings, apparently look-
ing for something worth stealing.7 The perpetrators scattered on
the ground the contents of Haynes' wallet and bags which Haynes
was carrying with him on that night, as he usually did.8 These bags
contained several articles of religious significance, including two Bi-
bles, rosary beads, plastic statues, olive oil, and religious tracts. 9 Of
particular significance were a religious tract entitled the "Game
Guy's Prayer"'10 and Haynes' voter registration card.
Before leaving the scene, Gathers beat Haynes with an umbrella
and then forced the umbrella up Haynes' anus.1 1 Gathers returned
to the park sometime later and stabbed Haynes to death with a
knife.12
The victim, Richard Haynes, was in his early thirties and unem-
ployed.13 For about two years prior to his death, Richard Haynes
had been experiencing some mental problems, which necessitated
his checking into a mental hospital on three occasions. 14 Haynes
considered himself a "Reverend Minister," even though he had no
formal religious training, and he would discuss his religious views
with anyone who would listen. 15
III. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Demetrius Gathers was tried in the Court of General Sessions
for Charleston County, South Carolina.1 6 The jury found Gathers
guilty of murder and first-degree criminal sexual assault.' 7 During
the guilt phase, the objects found scattered around Haynes' body18
were, for the most part without objection, 19 admitted into evidence
during the testimony of Charleston police officer Anthony Hazel. 20
However, there was no mention during the guilt phase of the con-
7 Id. at 2209.
8 Id. at 2210.
9 Id. at 2209.
10 Id. The "Game Guy's Prayer" is a religious tract which relied on football and
boxing metaphors, and extolled the virtues of the "good sport." Id. For the full text of
this prayer, see infra note 25.
11 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2208.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 2208.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 2208-09.
16 Id. at 2209.
17 Id.
18 These objects included the religious tract and Haynes' voter registration card. Id.
at 2209.
19 Id. at 2209.
20 Id. at 2209 n.**.
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tents of the papers found scattered around Haynes' body, including
the religious tract and the voter registration card.2 1
At the sentencing phase of the trial, all of the testimony and
exhibits were re-admitted into evidence. 22 The state presented no
additional evidence at the sentencing phase. 23 The source of the
present controversy arises from the prosecutor's closing argument
at the sentencing proceeding. 24 During his closing argument, the
prosecutor focused on the victim's personal qualities. Pointing out
that the religious tract was previously admitted into evidence, the
prosecutor proceeded to read the prayer entitled the "Game Guy's
Prayer," which was written on the tract.25 After reading the prayer,
the prosecutor commented on Mr. Haynes' personal qualities, mak-
ing inferences from the victim's possessions. 26 The prosecutor sug-
gested that, "Reverend Minister Haynes... was a very small person.
He had his mental problems. Unable to keep a regular job. And
wasn't blessed with fame or fortune. And he took things as they
came along. He was prepared to deal with tragedies that he came
across in his life."
27
The prosecutor then directed attention to the voter registration
card that Mr. Haynes carried on the night Gathers brutally beat and
stabbed him. The prosecutor commented on Mr. Haynes' personal
21 Id.
22 Id. at 2209.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 The prosecutor read the prayer in its entirety:
Dear God, help me to be a sport in this little game of life. I don't ask for any easy
place in this lineup. Play me anywhere you need me. I only ask you for the stuff to
give you one hundred percent of what I have got. If all the hard drives seem to
come my way, I thank you for the compliment. Help me to remember that you
won't ever let anything come my way that you and I together can't handle. And
help me to take the bad break as part of the game. Help me to understand that the
game is full of knots and knocks and trouble, and make me thankful for them. Help
me to be brave so that the harder they come the better I like it. And, oh God, help
me to always play on the square. No matter what the other players do, help me to
come clean. Help me to study the book so that I'll know the rules, to study and
think a lot about the greatest player that ever lived and other players that are por-
trayed in the book. If they ever found out the best part of the game was helping
other guys who are out of luck, help me to find it out, too. Help me to be regular,
and also an inspiration with the other players. Finally, oh God, if fate seems to
uppercut me with both hands, and I am laid on the shelf in sickness or old age or
something, help me to take that as part of the game, too. Help me not to whimper
or squeal that the game was a frameup or that I had a raw deal. When in the failing
dusk I get the final bell, I ask for no lying, complimentary tombstones. I'd only like
to know that you feel that I have been a good guy, a good game guy, a saint in the
game of life. Id. at 2209-10.
26 Id. at 2209.
27 Id. at 2210.
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qualities which he had inferred from Mr. Haynes' possession of the
card:
You will find some other exhibits in this case that tell you more about a
just verdict. Again this is not easy. No one takes any pleasure from it,
but the proof cries out from the grave in this case. Among the per-
sonal effects that this defendant could care little about when he went
through it is something we all treasure. Speaks a lot about Reverend
Minister Haynes. Very simple yet very profound. Voting. A voter's
registration card. Reverend Haynes believed in this community. He
took part. And he believed that in Charleston County, in the United
States of America, that in this country you could go to a public park
and sit on a public bench and not be attacked by the likes of Demetrius
Gathers .28
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the prosecu-
tor's "extensive comments to the jury regarding the victim's charac-
ter were unnecessary to an understanding of the circumstances of
the crime," and concluded that the remarks made by the prosecutor
during the closing argument at the sentencing phase "'conveyed
the suggestion appellant deserved a death sentence because the vic-
tim was a religious man and a registered voter.' "29 The South Car-
olina Supreme Court, relying on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Booth v. Maryland,30 reversed Gathers' death sentence
and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding.
3'
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority,3 2 Justice Brennan noted two recog-
nized principles which the Court has consistently adhered to in capi-
tal cases: "'[f]or purposes of imposing the death penalty ... [the
defendant's] punishment must be tailored to his responsibility and
moral guilt,' ',33 and, " '[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that
a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpabil-
ity of the criminal offender.' ,,34 Adhering to these principles, and
28 Id.
29 Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Gathers, 295 S.C. 476, 484, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144
(1988)).
30 482 U.S. 496 (1987). For a discussion of Booth, see infra note 35.
31 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2210.
32 Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices White, Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice White, in a brief concurrence, stated that
unless Booth (see infra note 35) was overruled, the defendant's death sentence had to be
reversed and the judgment below affirmed. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2211. Justice White
had dissented in Booth, 482 U.S. at 515-19.
33 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2210 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
34 Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
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relying on the holding two terms previous in Booth,35 the Gathers
Court concluded that the contents of the papers36 and the prosecu-
tor's related comments regarding Haynes' personal qualities cannot
be relevant to the "circumstances of the crime."
37
Justice Brennan explained that in Booth, the Court addressed
the issue of whether the use of victim impact statements (VISs) 38 in
capital sentencing proceedings violates the principle that a death
sentence "must be related to the moral culpability of the defend-
ant." 39 Justice Brennan noted that the Booth Court40 held that state-
ments regarding the personal qualities of the victims introduce facts
that might be" 'wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a partic-
ular defendant.' ",41 The Booth court deemed such information ir-
relevant to a capital sentencing decision and held that its admission
violates the eighth amendment 42 because it creates a constitution-
ally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in
an arbitrary and capricious manner.
43
Justice Brennan explained that the statements in Booth44 in-
cluded descriptions of the victims' personal charcteristics, the emo-
tional impact of the crime on the victims' family, and the family
35 482 U.S. at 496. In Booth, the petitioner, having been found guilty of two counts of
first-degree murder, was sentenced to death after the jury considered a presentence re-
port which was compiled by the Maryland Division of Parole and Probation. Id. at 498.
Under a Maryland statute, this report must include a victim impact statement, hereinaf-
ter, VIS, which describes the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family.
MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 413(b) (1982). Id. The VIS may be read to thejury during the
sentencing phase, or the family members may be called to testify as to the information
contained in the VIS. Id.
The VIS in Booth provided the jury with two types of information. First, it de-
scribed, based on interviews with family members, the personal qualities of the victims
and the emotional impact of the murders on the family. Id. at 499-500. Second, the
report set forth the family members' opinions and characterizations of the murders and
the defendant. Id.
36 Particularly, the religious tract entitled the "Game Guy's Prayer" and Haynes'
voter registration card.
37 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2211.
38 See supra note 35.
39 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2210.
40 Booth, 482 U.S at 496. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice White filed a dissent-
ing opinion, in which ChiefJustice Rehnquist andJustices O'Connor and Scalia joined.
Justice Scalia also filed a separate dissent, in which ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices
White and O'Connor joined.
41 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2210 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 504).
42 The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail should not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
43 Booth, 482 U.S. at 503.
44 See supra note 35.
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members' opinions of the crime and their characterization of the
defendant. 45 The Court noted that the statements at issue in the
present case regarding the personal qualities of Mr. Haynes are es-
sentially the same as the information included in the VIS in Booth,
which the Court held to be unconstitutional just two terms ago. Jus-
tice Brennan argued that although the prosecutor, rather than the
victim's family, commented on Mr. Haynes' personal qualities in the
present case, "the statement[s] [are] indistinguishable in any rele-
vant respect from [those] in Booth.' ' 46 Justice Brennan further con-
tended that, as in Booth, "'[allowing] the jury to rely on [this
information] ... could result in imposing the death sentence be-
cause of factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that
were irrelevant to the decision to kill.' 247
Justice Brennan acknowledged that the Booth opinion did not
foreclose the possibility that the type of information contained in
the VISs would be admissible if such statements " 'relate[d] directly
to the circumstances of the crime.' "48 The State of South Carolina
asserted that the prosecutor's comments were tied to the "circum-
stances of the crime." 49 The State also argued that the fact the de-
fendant scattered the personal possessions of the victim around on
the ground was "'relevant to the circumstances of the crime or re-
veal certain personal characteristics of the defendant,' "50 and
"should be the subject of permissible comment under the Eighth
Amendment."5 1
The Court agreed with South Carolina's assertion that the fact
that Gathers scattered around Mr. Haynes' personal belongings, ap-
parently looking for something of value to steal, was relevant to the
"circumstances of the crime" and, therefore, an admissible subject
for comment. 52 However, the Court contended that the prosecu-
tor's comments went "well beyond that fact."' 53 The Court con-
cluded that the contents of these personal papers "cannot possibly
be relevant to the 'circumstances of the crime.' -54 Justice Brennan
argued that the record did not show that Gathers read anything
45 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2210.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 2210-11 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 505).
48 Id. at 2211 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 2211 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 28, South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S.
Ct. 2207 (No. 88-305)).
51 Brief for Petitioner at 50, South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989) (No.
88-305).
52 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2211.
53 Id. See supra notes 25-28.
54 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2211.
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printed on the prayer card or the voter registration card.55 Refer-
ring to the evidence presented at trial that Gathers went through
Mr. Haynes' possessions quickly, throwing his belongings every-
where, Justice Brennan reasoned that Gathers probably did not read
any of Mr. Haynes' papers. 56 Furthermore, Justice Brennan noted
that the crime took place at night, in a wooded area,5 7 and the assail-
ants did not possess flashlights. 58 Justice Brennan concluded:
Under these circumstances, the content of the various papers the vic-
tim happened to be carrying when he was attacked was purely fortui-
tous, and cannot provide any information relevant to the defendant's
moral culpability. Notwithstanding that the papers had been admitted
into evidence for another purpose, 59 their content cannot be said to
relate directly to the "circumstances of the crime." 60
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice O'Connor,joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, 6 1 dissented from the Gathers holding, and argued that
although Booth was wrongly decided and should be overruled, the
Court could reach a proper disposition without overruling the re-
cently decided precedent. 62 Justice O'Connor framed the issue in
Gathers as whether to adopt a broad or a narrow reading of Booth.
She stated that a broad reading would establish a rigid eighth
amendment rule which eliminates virtually all consideration of the
victim at the sentencing phase. Alternatively, Justice O'Connor
noted that a narrower reading of Booth would allow the sentencing
jury to consider information regarding the victim and the extent of
the harm caused by the defendant, in the determination of the ap-
propriate punishment.
63
Justice O'Connor noted the considerable confusion regarding
the scope of the holding in Booth.64 She pointed out that some
courts, like the Supreme Court of South Carolina in the present
case, have broadly interpreted Booth for the proposition that evi-
dence regarding the victim's characteristics during the sentencing
phase, violates the eighth amendment, while other courts have inter-
55 Id.
56 Id. (citing app. at 27).
57 Id. (citing app. at 17; Record at 621-622, 926-927, Gathers (No. 88-305)).
58 Id. (citing Record at 622-623, Gathers (No. 88-305)).
59 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
60 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2211.
61 Justice Scalia also dissented in a separate dissenting opinion. See infra notes 86-
100 and accompanying text.
62 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2212 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
64 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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preted Booth as not prohibiting prosecutorial argument concerning
the victim's personal qualities at the sentencing phase. 65
Justice O'Connor rejected a rigid eighth amendment rule which
would prohibit a sentencing jury from hearing argument or con-
sidering evidence concerning the victim's personal qualities and
characteristics. 66 Justice O'Connor opined that nothing in the
eighth amendment prohibits the prosecutor from conveying to the
sentencing jury "a sense of the unique human being whose life the
defendant has taken."' 67 Justice O'Connor further argued that Booth
should not be read "to preclude prosecutorial comment which gives
the sentencer a 'glimpse of the life' a defendant 'chose to extin-
guish.' "68 Justice O'Connor continued, "'[T]he fact that there is a
victim and facts about the victim properly developed during the
course of the trial, are not so far out of the realm of 'circumstances
of the crime' that mere mention will always be problematic.' "69
The dissent further contended that the present case illustrates
the "one-sided nature of the moral judgment" that results from
the Court's broad reading of Booth.70 Justice O'Connor emphasized
that the Court has consistently required a sentencing jury to con-
sider a wide range of information concerning the defendant, includ-
ing background and character traits of the defendant, not merely the
65 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor cited the following cases in sup-
port of this observation: Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775, 782 (Ind. 1988) (The prose-
cutor's reference to personal facts concerning the victim and his family during argument
at the sentencing phase of a felony-murder trial was not improper because such com-
ments were based upon evidence in the trial.); Moon v. State, 258 Ga. 748, 756, 375
S.E.2d 442, 450 (1988) (The Court, relying on Brooks V. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1409
(11 th Cir. 1985) (see infra note 69 and accompanying text), held there to be no violation
of Booth either in the introduction of the evidence or in the state's arguments.); People v.
Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1089-90, 755 P.2d 960, 993-94, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 543-44
(1988) (The Court, in a prosecution for murders and sexual offenses that resulted in
death sentences, held that the prosecutor's comments during the penalty phase closing
argument, that when the jury thought about Christmas time, which was approaching, to
think of these families because these victims are gone forever, did not amount to error
under Booth.); People v. Ghent, 43 Cal. 3d 739, 771-72, 739 P.2d 1250, 1271, 239 Cal.
Rptr. 82, 103 (1987) (The prosecutor's brief and mild remarks concerning the impact of
the rape and murder on the victim's family merely noted the obvious loss resulting from
the murder: "Unlike Booth, where the jury was given lengthy and specific details regard-
ing the actual impact on the victim's family, here the prejudicial effect of the prosecu-
tor's comments was undoubtedly minimal or nonexistent.").
66 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2212 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 2213-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
68 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, (1988)
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting)).
69 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1409
(I 1th Cir. 1985) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986),judgment rein-
stated, 809 F.2d 700 (11 th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987)).
70 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2214 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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"circumstances of the crime." 7' This information is not directly rel-
evant to the "circumstances of the crime," Justice O'Connor ar-
gued, but it is relevant to the jury's assessment of both the
defendant as a person and his moral blameworthiness.
72
Just as evidence concerning the defendant is relevant to the
jury's sentencing determination, Justice O'Connor asserted that
"one of the factors that has long entered into society's conception of
proper punishment is the harm caused by the defendant's ac-
tions." 73 Justice O'Connor stated that retribution is a penological
goal of the death penalty, and quoted Tison v. Arizona,74 in which the
Court explained that" 'the heart of the retribution rationale is that a
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability
of the criminal offender.' -75 Justice O'Connor further argued that
one essential factor which is relevant to the jury's determination of
the defendant's culpability is the extent of the harm caused. 76
Justice O'Connor relied on Tison 77 to illustrate her contention
that the resulting harm caused by the defendant is directly relevant
to the capital sentencer's moral judgment in determining an appro-
priate sentence. The harm Gathers caused was the taking of Mr.
Haynes' life, and, therefore, the prosecutor's comments describing
the personal qualities of Mr. Haynes were admissible because the
comments served to assist the jury in their appreciation of the harm
which resulted from Gathers' actions. 78 Justice O'Connor further
supported her argument by referring to the fact that society pun-
71 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor cited the following cases in sup-
port of this statement: Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (The Court concluded that
"in all but the rarest kind of capital case, [the sentencer should] not be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and
of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death."); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (In Eddings, a 16 year old
was convicted of first-degree murder for killing a police officer and sentenced to death.
The Court held that the death sentence must be vacated because the trial judge refused
to consider mitigating evidence presented by the defendant. This evidence concerned
the defendant's violent background and turbulant upbringing.).
72 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2214 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
73 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
74 481 U.S. 137 (1987). In Tison, two brothers were convicted of first-degree murder,
armed robbery, kidnapping, and theft of a motor vehicle and sentenced to death. The
Court held that the eighth amendment does not preclude imposing the death penalty on
defendants who participated in their father's prison breakout and other related felonies
that resulted in four murders, even though the defendants did not intend to kill the
victims or inflict the fatal wounds.
75 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2214 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Tison, 481 U.S. at
149).
76 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77 For an explanation of Tison, see supra note 74.
78 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2214-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ishes reckless driving differently from vehicular homicide, where the
distinction rests only upon the ultimate harm caused and not upon
any difference in the defendant's mental state.79 In the death pen-
alty context, Justice O'Connor pointed out that no state authorizes
the imposition of the death penalty for attempted murder, yet the
defendant who has attempted to kill has the same mental state as a
murderer.80 The only distinction, Justice O'Connor argued, is the
harm that results from the defendant's actions, which is deemed suf-
ficient to support a difference in punishment.8'
Justice O'Connor concluded that nothing in the eighth amend-
ment precludes a community from considering its loss when impos-
ing a sentence, nor does anything in the eighth amendment
preclude commentary concerning the victim's personal qualities at
the sentencing phase of a capital trial. 82 Justice O'Connor further
argued that "a rigid Eighth Amendment rule which excludes all such
considerations is not supported by history or societal consensus,
and it withholds information from the sentencer which a State may
clearly deem relevant to the moral judgment of the capital sen-
tencer." 83 Rather, she asserted, the eighth amendment serves as a
shield against practices and punishments which are " 'cruel and un-
usual.' "184 Justice O'Connor deduced that the prosecutor's remarks
in the present case did not offend any aspect of the eighth
amendment.
85
79 Id. at 2215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
80 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The difference in punishment is between a sen-
tence of years and a sentence of death.
82 Id. at 2216. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
83 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
84 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
For text of the eighth amendment see supra note 42.
85 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor then attacked Gathers' other arguments which the defense as-
serted as alternate grounds for affirming the judgment below. First, the defense argued
that the prosecutor "'engaged in manipulation of the evidence and outright
fabrication,' " in his characterization of the victim's personal qualities based on infer-
ences from Mr. Haynes' possession of the "Game Guy's Prayer" and voter registration
card. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Respondent at 22, South Carolina
v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989) (No. 88-305)). Justice O'Connor explained that be-
cause the prayer was already in evidence without objection and could have been read by
the jury even if the prosecutor did not mention it in his closing argument, the prosecu-
tor's reading of the prayer may constitute harmless error and did not render the result-
ing sentence a denial of due process. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Second, Justice O'Connor refuted Gathers' argument that the defense did not have
an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's favorable statements concerning the victim's
personal characteristics. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor responded to
this by noting that the defense pointed to no evidence introduced at the sentencing
phase that the defendant was precluded from rebutting. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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C. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Scalia also dissented from the Gathers holding, arguing
that "the present case squarely calls into question the validity of
Booth"8 6 and asserted that Booth should be overruled.8 7 Justice
Scalia reiterated that he was among the four dissenters in Booth88
who believed that the decision in Booth "imposed a restriction upon
state and federal criminal procedures that had no basis in the
Constitution.-
8 9
Justice Scalia argued that Booth does perceptible harm and
should, therefore, be overruled. Justice Scalia contended that his
position is strengthened by "subsequent writings" 90 that describe
the negative consequences of a rule which effectively states that the
specific harm inflicted upon society by a murderer may not be taken
into account by the sentencing jury when deciding whether to sen-
tence the defendant to death.91
After arguing that Booth should be overruled, Justice Scalia pro-
ceeded to address the Court's concern that it should not overrule
such a recent decision.9 2 Justice Scalia argued that overruling Booth
Justice O'Connor further argued that just as the prosecutor could comment upon evi-
dence about the victim already in the record, so could counsel for the defense. Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). However, like the defendant's other due process claim, in
which Gathers asserted that the prosecutor's closing argument wrongly "invited" the
jury to impose the death sentence on the basis of the victim's religion and political affili-
ation, Justice O'Connor concluded that the issue would be best addressed by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina on remand. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
86 482 U.S. 496 (1987). See supra note 35 for an explanation of Booth.
87 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2217 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88 In addition to justice Scalia,Justices White, O'Connor and ChiefJustice Rehnquist
also dissented in Booth.
89 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90 Justice Scalia cited Justice O'Connor's dissent in the present case and ChiefJustice
Rehnquist's dissent in Mills v. Maryland, 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988), as examples of"subse-
quent writings" which point out the negative impact of the rule articulated by the Court
in Booth.
In Mills, the Court held that in a capital case, the sentencer may not be precluded
from considering any mitigating factor or relevant circumstance, including the defend-
ant's character or record, that the defense offers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
In his dissent in Mills, ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued that "since virtually no limits
are placed on the mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his
own history and circumstances," the state should not be "precluded from demonstrating
the loss to the victim's family, and to society as a whole, through the defendant's homi-
cide." Mills, 108 S. Ct. at 1876 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist
further argued that "the Court's decision in Booth prevents the jury from having before it
all the information necessary to determine the proper punishment for a first-degree
murder." Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
91 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92 Booth was decided in June of 1987. Justice Scalia acknowledged that there is a
concern that the Court should not overrule such a recent decision "lest our actions 'ap-
pear to be occasioned by nothing more than a change in the Court's personnel,'" Gath-
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will not "shake the citizenry's faith in the Court."9 3 He continued
by pointing out that overrulings of precedent rarely occur without a
change in the Court's personnel.9 4 "The only distinctive feature
here," Justice Scalia continued, "is that the overruling would follow
not long after the original decision,"9 5 and Justice Scalia cited sev-
eral cases in which the Court overruled a case which it had recently
decided.9
6
Justice Scalia further argued that because the error of the Booth
decision is "fresh," society has not yet adjusted to its existence and
the surrounding law has not yet been premised upon the validity of
the decision in Booth. Therefore, the opportunity to correct the
Booth decision should be "seized at once, before state and federal
laws and practices have adjusted to embody it." 9 7 Once society has
adopted such an erroneous decision, Justice Scalia argued, it will be
more difficult to correct it.98 Justice Scalia then stated that he would
consider it a violation of his oath to adhere to what he considers "a
plainly unjustified intrusion upon the democratic process in order
that the Court might save face." 99
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent by reiterating his conten-
tion that Booth should be overruled:
Booth has not even an arguable basis in the common law background
that led up to the Eighth Amendment, in any longstanding societal
tradition, or in any evidence that present society, through its laws or
the actions of its juries, has set its face against considering the harm
caused by criminal acts in assessing responsibility. The Court's opin-
ion in Booth, like today's opinion, did not even try to assert the con-
trary. We provide far greater reassurance of the rule of law by
eliminating rather than retaining such a decision.100
ers, 109 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting Brief for Barbara Babcock as Amici Curiae at 29-30,
South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989) (No. 88-305) (quoting Florida Dep't.
of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n., 450 U.S. 147, 154 (1981)
(Stevens, J., concurring)), and the rules announced by the Court no more than "the
opinions of a small group of men who temporarily occupy high office." Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
93 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 2217-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia cited the following cases is
support of this contention: Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986) (overruling
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 86-87
(1978)(overruling United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975)); West Virginia Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (overruling Minersville School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
97 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2218 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
LO Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The imposition of the death penalty in the present case would
probably not have been attacked on grounds that the sentence vio-
lated the eighth amendment had the prosecutor refrained from
commenting on Mr. Haynes' personal qualities in his closing argu-
ment. In fact, Demetrius Gathers may deserve the death penalty for
his heinous actions on the night of September 13, 1986. However,
as the majority in this case held, the prosecutor's comments con-
cerning Mr. Haynes' personal qualities were unnecessary to an un-
derstanding of the "circumstances of the crime," and wholly
unrelated to the defendant's moral culpability. 10 1 The majority rec-
ognized that the fact that Mr. Haynes was a religious man and a
registered voter was purely fortuitous and provided no information
relevant to Gathers' decision to kill.' 0 2
Allowing the jury to consider commentary regarding the vic-
tim's personal qualities, whether communicated by the prosecutor
or the victim's family members, 0 3 may result in the arbitrary and
capricious imposition of the death penalty. Therefore, presentation
of such evidence violates the eighth amendment.'0 4 Permitting the
sentencer to consider comments concerning the victim's personal
qualities effectively places the victim on trial, not the defendant.
Whether the defendant is sentenced to death would depend not on
the defendant's moral culpability or blameworthiness, but on the
sentencer's perception and value judgment of the personal qualities
of the victim.
Although the majority in Gathers reached the proper disposi-
tion, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, elected not to write a
substantial opinion. Instead, he essentially relied on the arguments
and reasoning employed by the majority in Booth two terms ago. 0 5
This Note critically analyzes the dissenters' arguments and as-
sertions,' 0 6 and concludes that these arguments and contentions are
largely unfounded, representing superficial arguments for the ad-
01 Id. at 2211.
102 Id.
103 See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
104 For text of the eighth amendment, see supra note 42.
105 The substance of these arguments will be discussed infra, and have been discussed
supra.
106 Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissenting opinion. However, the central argu-
ments made by Justice Scalia are essentially the same as those articulated by Justice
O'Connor in her dissent, with the exception thatJustice Scalia firmly believes that Gath-
ers "sqarely calls the validity of Booth into question," Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2217 (ScaliaJ.,
dissenting), and, therefore, Booth must be overruled in order to reach a proper disposi-
tion in the present case. See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
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missibility of commentary concerning the victim's personal qualities
at the sentencing phase of a capital trial.
The rationale behind the dissenters' position may not be that
such evidence or commentary is relevant to the defendant's moral
culpability and relates to the "circumstances of the crime," and is
therefore information which should be considered by the sentencing
jury in determining the proper punishment; 10 7 but instead, perhaps
the dissenters are motivated by an underlying desire to see an in-
creased use of the death penalty in capital cases, which would likely
result if the sentencer were permitted to consider emotionally
charged statements about the victim's personal qualities. 108
A. THE DISSENT'S DISTORTION
It is necessary for the sentencing jury to consider the extent of
the harm caused by the defendant's actions. However, the harm
caused in the case of a murder is the death of an innocent human
being, not the death of a religious person or a registered voter. The
dissenters distorted the contention that the sentencing jury should
be required to consider the extent of the harm caused as an essential
factor in determining the defendant's culpability.10 9 Contrary to the
dissenters' opinions, whether the victim is religious or atheist, rich
or poor, black or white, a registered voter or opposed to democracy
should not bear on the sentencing determination.
The sentence must relate to the defendant's actions and blame-
worthiness, and a purely fortuitous factor, such as whether the vic-
tim was a registered voter, has no place in the determination of a
proper sentence for a defendant. If it were otherwise, the sentencer
would be passing judgment on the victim by determining the de-
fendant's sentence based on the victim's attributes. Justice
O'Connor erroneously cited Tison 1t0 in support of the contention
that the harm caused by the defendant's actions is relevant to the
sentencer's judgment concerning a proper punishment.' Refer-
ring to Tison, Justice O'Connor noted that "[w]hat was critical to the
defendants' eligibility for the death penalty ... was the harm they
helped bring about: the death of four innocent human beings."
' "12
107 As Justice O'Connor contended in her dissenting opinion. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at
2211-17 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108 This hypothesis in no way expressly or impliedly asserts what the author's per-
sonal opinion is regarding the death penalty.
109 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (O'Connor and Scalia, JJ., dissenting).
110 481 U.S. 137 (1987). See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
I1I Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2214 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112 Id. at 2215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Although it is true that the defendants in Tison were eligible for
the death penalty because of the harm they helped to bring about,
the victims' personal qualities were irrelevant to the defendants' eli-
gibility for the death penalty. The Tison defendants' eligibility for
the death penalty was based on the fact that they killed four people;
it did not matter "who" the four victims were. The victims could
have been any four unfortunate people who happened to cross
paths with the defendants during the prison breakout of the defend-
ants' father. Tison, therefore, is not in any way supportive of the
dissenters' assertion that the eighth amendment does not preclude
the sentencing jury from considering commentary concerning the
personal qualities of the victim(s) at the penalty phase of a capital
trial.
In an attempt to support further her contorted line of reasoning
that the harm caused by the defendant is relevant to the capital sen-
tencer's moral judgment in determining an appropriate sentence,
Justice O'Connor analogized societies' punishment of reckless driv-
ing. She noted that society punishes reckless driving differently
from vehicular homicide, where the distinction rests only upon the
ultimate harm caused. The defendant's mental state is not determi-
native. t 3 Justice O'Connor also found an analogy to atempted
murder. She noted that no state authorizes the imposition of the
death penalty for attempted murder, yet the defendant who has at-
tempted to kill has the same mental state as one who has succeeded.
The only distinction, Justice O'Connor correctly argued, is the harm
resulting. 114
These examples do support the established proposition that the
resulting harm caused by the defendant, in terms of whether the
victim lives or dies, is relevant to the sentencing decision. However,
these examples do not support the dissenters' position that the per-
sonal qualities of the victim are relevant to the sentencing decision
and, therefore, are the subject of admissible comment at the sen-
tencing phase of a capital trial.
B. THE CREATION OF A CONSTITUTIONALLY UNACCEPTABLE RISK
If, as the dissenters advocate, commentary concerning the vic-
tim's personal qualities is permitted at the sentencing phase of a
capital trial, a constitutionally unacceptable risk is created that the
jury may impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious
113 Id. at 2215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
114 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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manner.115 Permitting the sentencing jury to consider such irrele-
vant information would result in the sentencers deciding the fate of
a particular defendant based on their subjective value judgments
concerning the victim's personal qualities as communicated to them
by the prosecutor, or by the victim's family, as in Booth." t 6
Allowing the jury to consider such information implies that de-
fendants whose victims were valued in the community are more de-
serving of the death penalty than those whose victims are perceived
to be less valued.1 17 As the Booth Court articulated, "[o]f course our
system ofjustice does not tolerate such distinctions."' I , The Court
in Booth further noted that "[tihis type of information does not pro-
vide a 'principled way to distinguish [cases] in which the death pen-
alty was imposed, from the cases in which it was not.' ",1t
In the present case, Gathers did not know Mr. Haynes prior to
the murder 120 and, therefore, had no knowledge of Mr. Haynes'
personal qualities. Permitting the jury to consider the prosecutor's
comments regarding Mr. Haynes' personal qualities would result in
imposing the death penalty based on factors about which Gathers
was totally unaware; therefore, the factors were irrelevant to his de-
cision to kill. 121 "This evidence could thus divert the jury's atten-
115 The Court in Booth, 482 U.S. at 503, also noted this intolerable result of permitting
the sentencing jury to consider information regarding the victim's personal qualities at
the sentencing phase of a capital trial.
116 Booth, 482 U.S. at 499. For the a discussion of Booth, see supra note 35.
117 In his dissent in the present case, Justice Scalia asked, "Would the fact that the
victim was a dutiful husband and father be a personal characteristic or an indication of
injury to others?" Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2217 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The response to
this question would be, "Does it really matter?"; whether the victim was a "dutiful hus-
band and father" is not relevant to the sentencing jury's decision. This information is
irrelevant to the defendant's decision to kill. What if the victim had no surviving family?
Does a murderer who "selects" this individual not deserve the same penalty as he would
receive if he murdered a "dutiful husband and father." Justice Scalia's quote illustrates
the element of arbitrariness which would pervade the sentencing procedure in capital
cases if such information were admissible at the penalty phase of a capital trial.
118 Booth, 482 U.S. at 506 n.8.
119 Id. (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)).
120 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2208.
121 The Court in Booth advanced substantially similar reasoning. Booth, 482 U.S. at
505. The Booth Court also quoted a 1984 state court decision which is relevant to this
discussion:
We think it obvious that a defendant's level of culpability depends not on fortu-
itous circumstances such as the composition of his victim's family, but on circum-
stances over which he has control. A defendant may choose, or decline, to
premeditate, to act callously, to attack a'vulnerable victim, to commit a crime while
on probation, or to amass a record of offenses .... In contrast, the fact that a
victim's family is irredeemably bereaved can be attributable to no act of will of the
defendant other than his commission of homicide in the first place. Such bereave-
ment is relevant to damages in a civil action, but it has no relationship to the proper
purposes of sentencing in a criminal case.
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tion away from the defendant's background and record, and the
circumstances of the crime,"' 122 which should be determinative of
the sentencing decision. This shifting of the focus of the trial away
from the defendant and onto the victim is impermissible at a pro-
ceeding where the question to be decided by the Court is whether
the defendant is to receive the ultimate sentence-death-or impris-
onment. The defendant is on trial, not the victim.
Another source of arbitrariness will be injected into the capital
sentencing decision if, as the dissenters advocate, the sentencing
jury is permitted to consider information pertaining to the victim's
personal qualities. This arbitrariness involves the risk that the capi-
tal sentencing decision will be influenced by the degree to which an
individual prosecutor is able to appeal to the emotions of the sen-
tencing jury through his/her commentary about the victim's per-
sonal qualities. The persuasiveness of the prosecutor in
communicating to the sentencer the admirable qualities of the vic-
tim, or the horrible grief and the sense of loss the victim's family is
experiencing, is irrelevant to the decision whether a defendant, who
may in fact deserve the death penalty, should live or die. Arbitrari-
ness results if sentencing decisions vary from case to case based on
the persuasiveness of the prosecutor's comments concerning the
victim's personal qualities.
The Court in Booth similarly argued that, although the victims'
family members were articulate and quite persuasive in expressing
their grief and sense of loss, there are other cases in which the fam-
ily members were not as articulate in describing their feelings, even
though their sense of loss is equally severe. 123 The Booth court cor-
rectly observed that "the fact that the imposition of the death sen-
tence may turn on such distinctions illustrates the danger of
allowing sentencing juries to consider this information."' 124 The
Gathers dissent inexplicably and disturbingly failed to acknowledge
the Booth Court's perceptive admonition.
C. THE DECISION IN BOOTH CONTROLS THE GATHERS CASE
Justice O'Connor erroneously argued that the Court could
reach a proper disposition in the present case without overruling
Booth. Justice O'Connor asserted that the central holding in Booth-
that statements about the harm to the victim's family are inadmissi-
Booth, 482 U.S. at 504 n.7 (quoting People v. Levitt, 156 Cal. App. 3d 500, 516-17, 203
Cal. Rptr. 276, 287-88 (1984)).
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ble at a capital sentencing proceeding-does not control the Gathers
case because at issue in the present case are solely the prosecutor's
comments concerning the victim.125
However, Booth is not limited to statements about the harm to a
victim's family. The VIS at issue in Booth included characterizations
by the victims' family of the victims' outstanding personal qualities
and the family members' opinions about the crime and the defend-
ant, as well as statements concerning the emotional and personal
problems the family members have faced as a result of the
murders. 126
The statements at issue in the present case concern the per-
sonal qualities of the victim; therefore, the VIS in Booth contained
information indistinguishable from the information presented by
the prosecutor in Gathers. The only distinction, aside from the word
choice, is the source of the commentary. In Gathers, the prosecutor
delivered the controversial statements, 127 while in Booth it was the
victims' survivors who characterized the victims' personal quali-
ties.128 This distinction, however, is irrelevant. Presentation of
such information at the sentencing phase of a capital trial, by either
the prosecutor or the victim's family members, creates a constitu-
tionally unacceptable risk that the sentencing jury may impose the
death penalty in an arbitrary manner.
Unlike the dissenters who joined Justice O'Connor's dissenting
opinion, Justice Scalia, writing a separate dissenting opinion in Gath-
ers,129 correctly recognized that the present case "squarely calls into
question the validity of Booth."'130 Likewise, Justice White, in his
brief concurrence in Gathers, recognized that unless Booth is to be
overruled, the judgment of the Supreme Court of South Carolina
must be affirmed.' 3 ' Justice White, who dissented in Booth, appar-
ently conceded that since the Court's holding two terms ago in
Booth, presentation of evidence or commentary concerning the vic-
tim's personal qualities is not permissible at the sentencing phase of
a capital trial. 13 2
125 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2212 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126 Booth, 482 U.S. at 499-500.
127 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2210.
128 Booth, 482 U.S. at 499.
129 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2217-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 2217 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 2211 (White, J., concurring).
132 Booth, 482 U.S. at 515-19 (White, J., dissenting).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
D. INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE ABOUT THE VICTIM'S PERSONAL
QUALITIES SHOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED FROM EVERY CAPITAL
SENTENCING PROCEEDING
The holding in the present case does not, and should not, pre-
clude the introduction of evidence or commentary concerning the
victim's personal qualities in every capital sentencing proceeding.
133
There are instances where evidence concerning the victim's per-
sonal qualities should be admissible at the sentencing phase of a
capital trial. In situations where the personal characteristics of the
victim were relevant to the defendant's decision to kill or relate di-
rectly to the "circumstances of the crime," the introduction of such
information should be admissible.
Facts about the victim's personal qualities are relevant in situa-
tions where "who" or "what" the victim was provided the impetus
for the defendant to kill; in these situations the defendant was aware
of the victim's personal qualities and these characteristics were di-
rectly relevant to the defendant's decision to kill. 134 Moreover, as
the majority in Booth noted, "there may be times that the victim's
personal characteristics are relevant to rebut an argument offered
by the defendant."' 3 5 However, in situations such as the present
case, where the victim's personal qualities neither were known by
the defendant, and, therefore, not relevant to the decision to kill,
nor related directly to the "circumstances of the crime," the intro-
duction of evidence about the victim's personal characteristics
should not be admissible at the sentencing phase of the capital trial
because of the risk that the jury may make the capital sentencing
decision in an arbitrary manner.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Gathers, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment
prohibits prosecutorial commentary concerning the victim's per-
sonal qualities at the sentencing phase of a capital trial.' 36 The
Court correctly reasoned that allowing the sentencing jury to con-
133 The majority in Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10, and the majority in Gathers, 109 S. Ct.
at 2211, recognized that the holding in each case does not mean that this type of infor-
mation will never be relevant in any context.
134 Examples of such situations include racially motivated murders, cases in which
religious differences result in a murder, or when the victim's beliefs are not in accord
with those of the murderer and these differences are the principal reason for the
murder.
135 Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(2) (prosecution may
show peaceable nature of victim to rebut charge that victim was aggressor).
136 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2210-11 (1989).
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sider commentary regarding the victim's personal qualities may
result in the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death pen-
alty.1 37 The Court relied on the arguments and reasoning employed
by the majority in Booth, decided two terms earlier, for the conclu-
sion that the contents of Mr. Haynes' papers and the prosecutor's
related comments concerning the victim's personal qualities which
he extrapolated from the victim's possessions, cannot be relevant to
the circumstances of the crime.13 8 Furthermore, the majority appro-
priately noted the fortuity and irrelevance of the victim's religious
character and status as a registered voter to the defendant's moral
culpability and blameworthiness.
The dissenters in Gathers argued13 9 that the victim's personal
qualities should be the subject of permissible comment at the sen-
tencing phase of a capital trial because such information indicates
the extent of the resulting harm caused by the defendant's actions,
which is an essential factor to the sentencing jury's determination of
both the defendant's culpabiltiy and a proper sentence.
However, the dissenters support their position with distorted
and unfounded arguments which may lead one to believe that the
rationale behind their position is not that such commentary or evi-
dence is relevant to the defendant's moral culpability and relates to
the "circumstances of the crime," but, perhaps may reflect an un-
derlying desire to see an increase in the frequency of imposing the
death penalty in capital cases. This increase would most likely result
if the sentencer were permitted to consider emotionally charged
statements concerning the victim's personal qualities. We cannot
begin to draw lines with regard to appropriate punishment in capital
cases based on subjective determinations of the worth of the victim.
ERIC S. NEWMAN
137 Id. The Gathers Court relied on the decision in Booth. See supra note 35 for an
explanation of Booth.
138 Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2211.
139 The dissenters also argued that Booth should be overruled, although Justice
O'Connor argued that overruling the recently decided precedent was not necessary to
reach the proper disposition in the present case. Id. at 2212.
